Introduction
About 90% of Mexican energy consumption comes from fossil fuels, including most of the electricity generated in the country. Mexico is the 13th largest Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emitter in the world and the second in Latin America -only behind Brazil-, contributing with approximately 1.4% of the global GHG emissions (Damassa et al., 2015; Mexico Gobierno de la Republica, 2015) . Among the current and expected consequences of climate change that directly impact on the country, we find more frequent and severe hurricanes and tornados, extended droughts that affect the quality and quantity of water resources, adverse effects on agricultural activities (which also put at risk food security), and drastic coastal flooding and erosion episodes. The country's environmental goals, in accordance with the Intended Nationally Determined Contribution affirmed at the climate summit held in Paris in 2015 (COP-21), require that 35% and 43% of domestic energy should come from renewable sources by 2024 and 2030, respectively. Meeting that goal is likely to require, among other steps, significant changes in the current electricity generation mix. The Mexican Energy Reform (December, 2013) opened an important window to introduce renewable energies in this sector, particularly solar energy. 1 To be more concrete, electricity generation explains more than 20% of total GHG emissions in Mexico. The residential sector, in turn, accounts for 25% of total electricity consumed. In this context, taking advantage of the fact that more than 75% of the country has an isolation greater than 5 kWh/m 2 /day, seems to be a very promising energy and environmental policy opportunity. Other countries, such as Germany and Spain, are currently recognized as the world leaders in installed PV systems. However, Mexico's solar potential resources are far superior and could be considered among the largest in the world (see, for example, SENER 1 In December 2015, Mexico's constitution was amended to create competition in the energy sector through the introduction of private investment, including the hydrocarbon sector (upstream, midstream and downstream) and the power sector (generation, transmission and distribution). The amendments maintained the state ownership and control of subsoil resource and were intended to modernize the state energy companies. One of the main goals was to reduce direct intervention of government and replace it with rational economic regulation.
(2016)).
On the other hand, the federal government through the state-owned electricity company (Comisión Federal de Electricidad, CFE) promotes excessive residential electricity demand by subsidizing more than 98% of Mexican households. The residential tariff structure consists of a multiple-block scheme and incorporates different regional marginal prices which are linked to average temperatures -i.e. high temperature zones afford lower marginal prices. 2 The fiscal burden associated to the electricity consumption of the residential sector has consistently increased during the last decade and currently represents more than 0.5% of the GDP. Moreover, given the universal and uniform application of this subsidy, the tariff scheme magnifies the inclusion error, wasting valuable resources. All this happens in the context of a country where poverty and inequality are significant social problems.
As a result, an ambitious plan aiming to deploy distributed photo-voltaic systems (DPV) among qualified households -i.e. those able to adopt solar technology in their rooftops-could help solve some of the challenges that Mexico is currently facing. A household adopting a DPV system would be ideally grid-connected so it could purchase electricity when the system is not producing enough power, or sell electricity when it over produces. The potential advantages include: first, a reduction of the fiscal burden (which today represents a figure of more than 5 billion of USD per year). Second, the DPVG program could bring significant GHG emissions savings by reducing traditional fossil fuel electricity generation (helping Mexico to comply with the energy and environmental goals). 3 Third, it could make possible to avoid costly future investments in traditional electricity generation, transmission and distribution since households adopting DPV systems would be grid-connected.
In this paper, we provide a comprehensive assessment of the current conditions under which the Mexican residential electricity sector operates. Using the characterization of Mexican households and simulating an scenario of massive DPV system adoption, we measure the potential subsidy savings and the benefits to residential users. 4 Also, from an environmental perspective, we estimate the reduction in air pollution emissions and water resource usage associated to the simulated scenario. 5 Finally, we provide some policy suggestions about how the current electricity consumption subsidy could be (partially) converted into a DPV system adoption subsidy, standing up for an integral selection mechanism aiming to target the poor in an accurate way.
Literature review
We analyze the possibilities and the impact that massive rooftop solar panel installation in the Mexican residential sector would have on a set of relevant socio-economic variables: household welfare, government budget, air pollution and water resources usage. The available related literature for Mexico and other emerging countries is relatively scarce and, most of the times, is focused on a narrower set of issues. Grande et al. (2015) analyzes the profitability of DPV systems for a narrow subset of high-consumption users in Mexico. The calculations made in that study do not use micro-data and are based on industry average figures for the year 2010. Alemán-Nava et al. (2014) presents an overview of the renewable energy options available in Mexico without focusing on any particular energy source. Our paper belongs to broader branch of international literature that studies the possibilities of success solar panel technologies have as an alternative clean energy source to traditional power generation -i.e., mainly based on fossil fuels.
In this broader picture, we find mixed evidence to preferences for renewable over conventional energy. Salim and Rafiq (2012) utilizes aggregate data from six major developing countries (Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Philippines and Turkey) and finds evidence that renewable energy consumption is directly and positively determined by income, and that pollution is inversely associated with renewable energy consumption in three of those six countries. Moving to studies that are grounded on micro data analysis, an early paper by Long (1993) works with several variables that are associated with renewable energy adoption. The author analyzes U.S. data on tax returns, addresses the predictors of energy conservation and renewable energy investments, and finds that energy price changes and subsidies highly influence these expenditures, while the effect of income is not statistically significant. Mills and Schleich (2012) uses household level data from 11 countries in Europe and finds that energy efficient technology adoption and conservation practices are highly correlated with households characteristics. In particular, the presence of young children makes households more likely to care about savings for environmental reasons, while elder households are more likely to care about financial savings. Similarly, Willis et al. (2011) finds evidence that households composed of people aged 65 and over have different behavioral responses to renewable energy adoption: concretely, they are less prone to adopt micro-generation technologies. Furthermore, Bergmann et al. (2008) finds that urban and rural survey respondents have different preferences for renewable energy projects. Scarpa and Willis (2010) uses a household survey for the U.K.
to estimate conditional and mixed logit models, and then derives willingness-to-pay for different micro-generation technologies (solar PV, solar thermal, micro-wind, heat pumps, biomass boilers and pellets stoves). This study finds that while renewable energy adoption is significantly valued by residential users, that value is not sufficiently large to most households due to the high initial capital investment. Lastly, Islam and Meade (2013) models the adoption prob-ability of PV solar panels by households using rich data from a group of Canadian households on attribute preferences and social characteristics.
In our paper, we are not able to isolate and address the DPV adoption problem. Our dataset only allows us to infer different (arbitrary) DPV technology adoption scenarios, and quantify the potential benefits in terms of household expenditure, electric subsidy reduction, and environmental impact. In order to provide an objective measure of these variables, we choose a particular situation that works as an upper bound of the potential effects. Section 4 below explains in detail our empirical exercise.
In a more specific collect of literature, a number of studies analyze the economic feasibility of DPV systems for residential users. Pillai et al. (2014) proposes a metric to estimate the expected benefits of PV systems in the U.K. and India, and finds that most locations in India would favor from DPV systems usage, whereas most locations in U.K. would need some cost reduction to achieve near-term benefits. The authors also highlight the importance that location-based planning has on policy design. Mitscher and Rüther (2012) studies the competitiveness of grid-connected, DPVG in five Brazilian cities. Assuming a net-metering policy, the authors analyze different scenarios for technology adoption and find evidence that gridconnected PV can be economically competitive in this emerging country.
Finally, there is a complete body of literature analyzing the technical feasibility of massive DPV system adoption with regards to its impact on the electricity network quality, safety and reliability (see for example Caamaño-Martín et al. (2008) and Eftekharnejad et al. (2013) for analysis of the effect on distribution and transmission networks, respectively). In our paper, we leave that discussion aside, and simply assume the current power system is able to accommodate the power generated by the new DPV systems adopted by residential users. 6 6 Another discussion not contemplated in our paper has to do with unconnected households, typically located in isolated rural areas (see, for example, Bhuiyan et al. (2000) for a case study of remote zones in rural Bangladesh). In the Mexican case, the households connected to the grid are more than 99% (according to the World Bank, Sustainable Energy for All, Global Electrification Database). Therefore, we only focus on those households connected to the grid. annual maximum consumption threshold which, if crossed, makes the corresponding household a high-consumption user (DAC). In that case, the DAC user affords a two-part tariff that is composed of a fixed charge and a marginal price which is substantially more expensive than the regular increasing block price structure mentioned before. Table 1 shows as an example the tariff class 1 in 2016. This tariff class is found across all the sixteen regions but Noroeste and Península. Note: users in class 1 are considered as DAC when annual consumption > 3,000 kWh Source: CFE Residential users (excluding DAC) received an average subsidy of 60%, whereas households classified as high consumption users pay an end-user price approximately 58% above the marginal cost. DAC users, however, historically represented less than 5% of total residential consumption. As a result, the government has subsidized almost 60% of residential electricity consumption during the last decade. Additionally, the number of users connected to the electricity network has also increased and it is expected to keep going up in the coming years. The fiscal burden associated to the residential electricity subsidy increased from 40 bil- Table 2 reports a summary of the sales, costs, subsidies and price-to-cost ratio by tariff class in 2015. It is evident that the current cross subsidy situation is unsustainable: a reduced number of 'penalized' households classified as DAC users afford a price substantially above production costs but cannot offset the huge deficit caused by the remaining seven under-priced tariff classes. Source: CFE As a result, there is an (almost) generalized subsidy scheme which is far from being targeted to the poor. The subsidy explains a heavy and growing fiscal burden to the federal government.
Although the main purpose of this study is not to provide a solution to this critical situation, we will provide some potential results (derived from our simulations) that have concrete policy 8 implications in terms of the current electric subsidy scheme.
Solar panel costs
According to Fu et al. (2016) , the continuing total cost decline of PV modules confirms the economic competitiveness of solar PV for the industry across residential, commercial and utility sectors in the United States. The factors driving the cost reduction are: lower module and inverter prices, optimized system configurations, increased competition, lower installer and developer overheads, and improved labor productivity. Figure 1 shows the long-run evolution of solar PV module prices. In the case of Mexico, the country has similar and even lower hardware costs than U.S., 9 and the non-hardware costs (mainly labor during the installation stage) are considerably lower.
In the words of leading local PV power developers, 7 total cost of grid-connected, ready-to-use DPV system is currently below 2 USD per watt of installed capacity. In particular, the 'soft'
costs are expected to continue declining as the solar panel industry develops. 8 In sum, the initial monetary barrier to adopt a PV technology (i.e., the overall adoption cost) is expected to become less significant in the coming years. Therefore, our empirical exercise is a valuable contribution. Thirdly, once we have simulated the performance of a typical DPV system and retrieved electricity consumption for each household included in the ENIGH-2014, we establish some requirements to select the group of households that are able to adopt solar panels in their rooftops. Since our goal is to provide an upper bound of the (potential) program effects, we assume that each household that qualifies as an adopter, does install the corresponding DPVG technology. Concretely, we restrict our attention to dwellings which can support the solar panel structure (e.g., those homes with shingle, concrete slab, or similar roof materials; also solid walls made of bricks, blocks, stone, quarry, cement or concrete; and firm floors made of cement, wood, mosaic, or other coating). We only include independent houses and exclude departments in multi-floor buildings, or commercial premises used as housing. We assume solar panels can only be installed by houses that are occupied by the owners (and exclude rented houses). Given the lack of a variable that indicates the area surface of the house, we take as reference that each room (excluding bathrooms and kitchen) has, on average, 9 square meters of ceiling surface suitable for the adoption of the PV technology. 11 We also assume that only those households with a generation capacity able to cover the total electricity consumption needs are the ones adopting the solar panels. Finally, to simulate the program impact, we assume connection to the grid is done under a net metering scheme with 2014 end-user electricity tariffs.
The potential (i.e., maximum) number of households that might adopt a DPV system amounts to approximately 15 million households, which practically represents half of the resi-9 The Value Added Tax (VAT) is 16%, and some cities also include a Street Lighting Rate which ranges from 5% to 10% of the electricity bill. 10 We basically invert the corresponding tariff formula from the original household expenditure data. In so doing, we apply a similar methodology to the one used by Navajas (2009) and Hancevic and Navajas (2015) .
11 With regards of the area needed for the rooftop PV panel, we assume 160W/m 2 with a ground coverage ratio of 0.70, which leads to approximately 112 W/m 2 . MXP. These significant differences mainly correspond to differences in consumption levels (recall we assume adopters install solar panels to cover their annual electricity consumption).
Household Welfare
Household welfare changes can be divided into two sub-periods: the negative changes in utility or 'losses' derived from the initial investment outlays, and the subsequent utility 'gains' once electric bill savings become effective. Other potential monetary benefits, such as renewable or clean energy certificates (commonly referred to as RECs), are not included in our welfare calculations. The reason is that, by the time this paper was written, RECs were not yet instrumented for residential users in Mexico.
In this section, we measure actual expenditure changes and their corresponding welfare effects. We use a simple methodology to calculate aggregate welfare variations from changes in 12 The actual total number of residential users according to the CFE records in 2016 was approximately 35 million households. The corresponding figure in our study differs since we based our calculations on the ENIGH-2014 information. Hence, our study considers a different sample period and relies on the survey sampling weights. We also eliminate several observations due to sensible missing data and/or inconsistencies. In that context, the (expanded) total number of users that we use in this paper is approximately 30 millions. Source: own calculations using ENIGH 2014 and CFE data.
individual utility assuming a particular social welfare function. Using a simple parameterization (see Newbery (1995) ) 13 , we assume the social welfare function is additive W = ∑ h U h /H, where U h is the utility of household h and H is the total number of households. Utility has the following iso-elastic functional form:
The variable x h is the household total income (or total expenditure) and the coefficient v can be interpreted as a parameter of social inequality aversion.
Under this specification, the social marginal utility of income (expenditure) is computed by
h , and social welfare can be approximated by the (socially) weighted sum of household income (expenditures). A simple manipulation of the welfare function defined above leads to the following result for the relative welfare change:
We use this expression later in this study to measure the relative welfare effect of the assumed massive DPV adoption scenario.
Measurement
At this stage, we do not consider any specific financing alternative and assume that households pay the initial investment in full during the first period. We also assume a uniform discount rate equal to 2%, which is equivalent to the average real interest rate for time deposit during the last five years in Mexico. Finally, we suppose each household electricity spending grows at a 0.5% annual rate (measured in real terms). Table 6 shows the levelized household savings due to DPV system adoption, the project payback period, and the internal rate of return, IRR. There are tariff classes for which adoption The total sum of annualized benefits (net savings) for households adopting a DPV system is approximately 12 billion MXP/year. With regards to the payback period, for a DAC user it only takes 5 years to recover its investment, whereas for an 1F user it takes approximately 24 years.
The IRR reflects the same pattern: a DAC user can finance the investment with an interest rate of up to 26%. On the other hand, for an 1F user the project is unprofitable even with a zero interest rate.
Similarly, Table 7 illustrates the same variables for each CFE distribution region. On average, the adoption of DPV systems seems to be a good investment alternative in most distribution regions. In particular, the Baja California region has the largest expenditure savings and IRR, and the shortest payback period. Conversely, the Noroeste region presents the smallest expenditure savings and IRR, and the longest payback period.
Finally, using equation 1 we provide a measure for the annualized percentage change in household welfare. Tables 8 and 9 present the corresponding estimates assuming an income As stated before, the DAC users adopting the PV module are the most favored while 1E and 1F are clearly in a disadvantaged position. Finally, households located in Baja California (Noroeste) experience, on average, the largest positive (negative) changes in welfare.
Opportunity cost pricing
So far, we have assumed that the current tariff scheme remains unaltered in the future. Accordingly, the current situation where tariffs are heavily subsidized undermines the possibilities of PV system adoption because the savings from not purchasing electricity from the power grid are artificially low. In that sense, without going into the socially optimal design of electricity subsidies, and without suggesting any specific line of reform (which is beyond the scope of this study), Tables 10 and 11 present a simple exercise that serves as benchmark, where users are assumed to pay the actual cost of the service. Specifically, we assume a hypothetical situation where electricity prices reflect the long-run sustainable opportunity costs. If we consider this new staring point, the benefits for households are considerable higher.
The larger future electric bill savings entails faster payback periods and higher internal rates of return. Under this hypothetical scenario, even 1F users (the least favored group in terms of DPV system possibilities) have a good opportunity to adopt solar panels in their rooftops.
Similarly, Table 11 presents the counterfactual outcomes assuming opportunity cost pricing for Source: own elaboration based on ENIGH 2014 and CFE.
The relative change in household welfare for each tariff class and distribution region is presented in Tables 12 and 13 , respectively. Once again, the results show the larger savings from the higher electricity bills avoided in the future, due to the counterfactual opportunity cost pricing situation. 
Government Revenue
Household electricity consumption is heavily subsidized as pointed out before. On the one hand, the federal government collects the value-added tax (16% rate), and most local governments collect a street lighting tax (which ranges from 5% to 10%) through the electricity bill. The government net revenue results in a significant fiscal deficit. However, if 15 million households described in the previous sections install the DPV system, the government net 
Environmental impacts
In this section we calculate the environmental impact of the massive DPV system adoption. Our analysis relies on the emission factors recently published by SENER (2017): .00283 kg/kWh Table 15 presents the environmental outcomes of the massive DPV system adoption scenario -i.e., 15 million households install a DPV system that enables to cover 100 % of household electricity consumption.
As can be seen, the positive environmental effects are very significant, and clearly would help Mexico meet its commitments agreed at COP-21 in Paris, in December 2015, such as the 43% of the electricity from clean energy sources and the CO 2 reduction by 2030. In the later case, DPVG plan presented here will save about 1% of the total emissions projected under the INDC mitigation unconditional scenario (Mexico Gobierno de la Republica, 2015) . In order to provide a monetary measure, we value emissions and water resource savings. There is no single price for each of these air pollutants and water, and no global agreement has been reached. In the case of Mexico, however, the government sets a tax of around 3 USD per ton of carbon emitted. In some developed countries such as Sweden, the corresponding price could be as high as 130 USD per ton (Ward et al., 2015) . According to CONAGUA (2016), the rate per 5 Capital subsidy, consumption subsidy, or a combination of both?
The current scheme suffers from the maximum possible inclusion error: it virtually includes all the population of the country. Ideally, in a movement to decrease the heavy electricity subsidy burden, Mexican policymakers should modify the current scheme to better target the subsidy to the poor. However, a deep discussion of this topic clearly has costly political implications, therefore it is not part of the political agenda at the moment. Thus, the simulation in section 4.2 of how a return to opportunity cost pricing would provide correct incentives to DPV system adoption is simply an evaluation exercise, with no possible empirical implementation.
In this context, an elegant way out of the current massive energy subsidy would be to (partially) replace it for a program that subsidizes the solar panel adoption. Recall from section 4.1.1 that the major obstacle to adoption is the costly initial outlay. This way the new government budget would be practically unaltered during the initial technology adoption phase (e.g., 5 years). However, once a considerable number of households has adopted the PV technology, the overall subsidy account (i.e., electricity subsidy + DPV subsidy) would be substantially reduced (see table 14 for an approximation to the long-run final situation).
From a broader perspective, it is worth emphasizing that a program of the sort described above would eventually imply the replacement of the current consumption subsidy for a capital subsidy. If no action is taken to target the poor, the distributive impact of the new subsidy scheme could be socially undesirable. Table 16 illustrates this point. Using our simulation of section 4, the percentage of potential PV technology adopters reflects an uneven penetration across per capita income deciles. In contrast, with the current electricity subsidy both the percentage of consumption subsidized and the percentage of households receiving the subsidy are more balanced across deciles.
In sum, the current residential electricity subsidy suffers from a critical targeting problem that goes beyond any efficiency consideration: all households, poor and non-poor, are the beneficiaries. And a massive program supporting the adoption of solar panels could end up in a very regressive mechanism. A well-thought-out strategy is needed on how to focus a more complex subsidy structure on the less privileged social classes. It is necessary to bring together a restrictive social tariff scheme that contemplates energy access and consumption 16 , and a program that provides the correct incentives for DPV system adoption. Ideally, both mechanism should rely on a common means testing instrument that properly identifies the qualified households. 
Concluding remarks and policy implications
The implementation of a massive DPVG program in the Mexican residential sector would bring more gains than losses. That is true both in economic and environmental terms. Even though residential users are quite heterogeneous, we can identify patterns that are common to most of them. Hence, from the perspective of a representative user (e.g., the average user), the initial investment outlay is more than compensated by the reduction in traditional energy expenditure (i.e., CFE electric bill). 17 In that context, the current electricity consumption subsidy plays a negative role since for many users it is more attractive to continue paying low energy prices than afford a costly capital investment necessary to install a DPV system. Even for a vast group of households that has an estimated positive net present value from the DPV system adoption, the corresponding payback period could be too long to justify such an investment.
The situation would be quite different if electric prices reflected the actual (true) opportunity costs of generation, transmission, and distribution. In that case net present values and IRR 17 Private benefits could be larger if household utility also worth the social benefits of a cleaner environment.
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would be higher, and the payback period would be considerably shorter. However, returning to opportunity cost pricing seems not to be an option under the current political situation. Moreover, a social tariff scheme that correctly target the poor and excludes high-income households from the subsidy is not even discussed. In that context, a partial transformation of the electricity consumption subsidy to a DPV system adoption subsidy could be an alternative.
From the government perspective, each household adopting the PV technology represents a reduction in the subsidy account. This fact opens a real and concrete possibility. It would be possible to implement a mechanism through which the government replaces the current electricity consumption subsidy with a (temporal) DPV system adoption subsidy. In this setting, residential adopters would not suffer from the negative financial effect implied by the costly capital investment during the transition, and the government would simply transfer the resources from one subsidy account to another. In the medium-to long run, all agents involved would benefit from this policy.
Even in the hypothetical subsidy transition scenario described in the previous paragraph, the need for accurate targeting goals emerges once again. If a massive DPV subsidy scheme were to be implemented without a serious livelihood assessment, it could be possible to end up in a undesired situation where the new capital subsidy has a very regressive impact.
From an environmental perspective, the implied outcomes obtained from the massive adoption scenario analyzed in this study are indisputably positive for the whole society. Furthermore, Mexico would be in a better position to comply with the environmental goals agreed in the COP-21 in Paris. However, it is the Mexican government the subject responsible to the environmental goals assumed and not the Mexican households themselves. In this line of thoughts, households adopting a DPV systems should receive the number of RECs that corresponds to the GHG emissions avoided. If this instrument is materialized, the potential benefits of having a DPV system will be larger, and clean technology adoption will be favored.
There are several positive effects (not evaluated in this study), that would materialize in the creation of new jobs and investments, especially in the solar panel industry (mainly at the installation stage). Finally, the chances are that the conventional energy producer (i.e., CFE)
would become more efficient in a thought strategy to become more competitive.
